Mathias Royce

The Rise and Propagation of Political Right-Wing Extremism: The Identification and Assessment of Common Sovereign Economic and Socio-Demographic Determinants.

A study using comparative methods and techniques to explain and to determine the prevailing economic and socio-demographic aspects of recent and distinct extremist movements in Australia, Germany, Austria and Hungary.
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Abstract

To what extent are surges of political right-wing populism in modern democracies linked to macro-economic and socio-demographic factors? This comparative study aims to verify that the occurrence of specific patterns reflected in unanimous key economic denominators amongst selected free-market economies as well as selected socio-demographic factors prevalent in society, effectively lead to the inception and upsurge of democratically-endorsed right-wing extremism. Moreover, the objective is to highlight and conclude possible correlations between the upsurge of Australian radical and militant right-wing extremism of the 1980s, and equivalent political and civil movements in Germany, Austria and Hungary in subsequent decades.

Biographical Synopsis

Mathias Royce (mathias.royce@student.swissmc.ch) is an Open University Graduate with a Masters Degree in Business Administration and a current Doctoral Candidate in Political Economy at the Swiss Management Center University in Zurich/Switzerland. His research interests include contemporary European and pan-Asian/Pacific Comparative Politics, Austrian Economics and Libertarian Political Philosophy.

Mathias Royce
Doctoral Candidate in Political Economy
Swiss Management Center University
Zurich, Switzerland

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Introduction

The majority of liberal democracies in contemporary European politics seem to be imperilled by surges of sovereign political radicalisation. Precisely this radicalisation should be considered as attributable to the inception and rise of right-wing populism, leading to increased authoritarian tendencies and democratic illiberalism, affecting the civil rights of the citizens of European states. This phenomenon is not geographically exclusive to Europe, but Europe indeed serves very well the purpose of comparatively illustrating the previous three decades that marked the various ascends of right-wing populism in Western and Central European sovereign states. In consideration of the scope of such political comparison the fundamental tenets and aims of this paper hence are manifold, but first and foremost, it does not aim to explain evolutionary details of individual right-wing doctrines or the extent to which these political right-wing doctrines curtail democratic liberties. Neither is it the intention to programmatically profile or to position these right-wing doctrines according to their congruence or to discuss in any length the exclusive characters of such doctrines that turned into ideologies of highly differential nature. All of these aforementioned aspects have been debated already in great length and only adding to this ongoing debate will yield in my opinion, little value. Nonetheless, one of the key objectives of this paper is to determine whether or not Australia’s surge of political right-wing radicalism of the 1980s can and should be seen as the historical and non-causal precedence case for mounting radical tendencies in Western and Central Europe in the subsequent decades. What exactly is meant by non-causal precedence case, though? My hypothesis states that Australia’s aforementioned surge of right-wing populism was subject to some inherent economic and socio-demographic characteristics which could lend themselves potentially to future adaption by other states in similar economic and socio-demographic settings. Hence, non-causal should therefore only be understood in a non-engaging manner, i.e. it is evident that the appearance of radical and neo-fascist populism in Europe was not triggered by the advent of such populism in Australia as
either location should be seen as a separate instance. Subsequently, the possibility of such populism spreading or propagating from Australia to Europe cannot be deemed feasible due to the spawning of political radicalism in Europe having its own originating roots. Certainly there are other instances of political right-wing activism apart from the states I will mention in this paper. As a matter of fact, I probably would have significant difficulties to name a sovereign state of political importance (excluding purposely politically insignificant dwarf-states, such as e.g. Andorra or Liechtenstein) that currently does not have one political right-wing movement in place in one way or another. Why I have singled-out Germany, Austria and Hungary to stand the test of characteristic congruence with Australia for the purpose of this paper is explained not only because of presumed inherent similarities with regards to economic and socio-demographic characteristics, but rather through the sovereign political qualities and features of the four states which differ from each other. This combination of circumstances, i.e. the congruence of socio-demographic and economic factors as well as recently proclaimed independence or state foundation amongst these preselected states in contrast to their dissimilarities concerning their individual sovereign political agenda, should yield the basis for a conclusive comparative study.
**Australia**

Since Australian federation in 1901, political radicalisation has come a long way in Australian Politics. Nationalism, or rather national identification, began in Australia as early as in the late 19th century with a movement that became to be known as the ‘White Australia Policy’. To protect the interest of the established ruling class in Australia against predominantly Asian and non-white immigrants in the competition of natural resources on Australian territory, the ‘White Australia Policy’ propagated throughout the first half of the 20th century within Australia to the status of a national identifier. Rather simply put: to be truly Australian meant being ‘white’ (Griffiths 2005).

The ‘White Australia Policy’ was indeed more than just a movement of the ruling class to protect economic interests but as such it was also exploited throughout the years by various aggregated interest groups and political parties, such as Labor and Conservatives, who used the idea of a white Australia as an instrument to win consent amongst the voting communities. The historical cornerstone of the ‘White Australia Policy’ is being marked through the royal assent of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 – essentially a legislation that restricted non-white immigration to Australia.

Just how deeply concerned politics then were with keeping Australia racially white, shows the following statement by William Morris Hughes in 1901, then Labor MP for the West Sydney Constituency and then future Prime Minister of Australia: ‘Our chief plank is, of course, a White Australia. There’s no compromise about that. The industrious coloured brother has to go – and remain away!’ It is fundamental to understand, that one of the very first Australian political parties, Labor, should be first and foremost considered as having been racist, rather than socialist (McQueen 1970). In terms of setting society’s political agenda and policies, the then ruling class in Australia instigated the creation of a shared interest between workers and employers, fostering the
ideas of a white Australia. Consequently with the foundation of a political party by the working class in defence of their existential requirements, the representative offspring resulted in the creation of a politically active Labor party already tainted by racism.

The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 was initially designed to restrict access to Australian immigration for any unwanted immigrants. As such it was predominantly targeted at Asian immigrants towards the start of the 20th century, but throughout the years prior to the Great Depression and in between the Great Depression and World War II, the applicative scope of the immigration act significantly expanded to also encompass political and economical refugees from the European continent. It is interesting to note, though, that throughout the years of the Great Depression and throughout World War II, NOM [Net Overseas Migration] to Australia was virtually non-existent (Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 2001). With a change of global immigration patterns after the end of World War II and an increase of sovereign trade by now independent, decolonised Asian countries, the government endorsed ‘White Australia Policy’ was slowly starting to become obsolete. For Australia’s economy which was especially concerned about the ascent of increased trade opportunities in the Asia-Pacific zone, the policy was viewed upon more like a burden and was hated in the region (Thorne 1985), rather than being perceived to be a safeguard of ‘denationalisation’. Consequently, in between 1947 and until the royal assent of the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act, policies were introduced gradually that eased the scope of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 until it was finally repealed in 1975 and officially with it, the ‘White Australian Policy’. The Racial Discrimination Law of 1975 outlaws any form of racial discrimination and makes such discrimination unlawful on a federal level. In the advent of abolishment of racial discrimination, then Prime Minster Gough Whitlam proclaimed the ‘multicultural’ Australia – an Australia that embodies the cultural and linguistic diversity of Australian society (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2007).
Since 1973, Australia’s nationalistic identification centres on this idea of being a multicultural nation and the Australian Government is spending a significant amount of effort to propagate the idea of racial diversity that accompanies the inspiration of being such a truly multicultural nation. This ‘multiculturalism’ thence should be seen in a representative manner similar to the identification of Southern Africa with being a ‘Rainbow Nation’. Evidence of this belief of a mix of multiple cultures and ethnicities can nowadays be found in the common identification as Australian through items of popular culture. Such items are generally classified as ‘Australian’ and this might be something as simple as a packet of particular biscuits (Tim Tams), a particular bread-spread (Vegemite), a pair of stockman’s boots (R. M. Williams), a music band (AC/DC) or a specific song (We are Australian/The Seekers). Understandably, both the sale of Tim Tam producer Arnott’s in 1997 and the re-registration of the Vegemite trademark to US multinational companies have created a public uproar, as these asset sales were understood to be affecting items of national identity. Apart from references to Australian ‘multiculturalism’ in popular culture, even the nation’s Anthem Advance Australia Fair, which was instated in 1984 in favour of the Royal Anthem, makes a particular reference to aforementioned Australian ‘multiculturalism’. As such, the anthem expresses a sense of belonging, togetherness and shared responsibility that encapsulates perhaps the history and commonalities of all Australian emigrants through a particular line of lyrics in the 2nd verse: ‘For those who’ve come across the seas’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2008). Nevertheless, the anthem does not pay any particular tribute to Australia’s indigenous people and one should thence put in question the existence of and the relationship between a predominantly emigrant, white Australian society in the context of the rights and liberties of its indigenous, tribal society. This gives rise to the prevailing question that shall be answered in the next section: has the ‘White Australia Policy’ of antecedent years led to a rejection of nationalistic identifiers amongst the population of non-white, predominantly Asian immigrants that consequently then culminated in unequivocal, bilateral racist tendencies amongst Australians and non-white immigrants? Are non-white immigrants, despite the Racial Discrimination Act,
discriminated by the white Australian society e.g. through means of economic hardship and failure of socio-demographic integration? It is clear that indigenous tribes do not even remotely share the same vision of a white man’s Australia – but what about non-white immigrants? Has Whitlam’s experiment of ‘multiculturalism’ indeed failed and to what extents are economic reasons jointly responsible for its perceived demise?

Ascertaining the Australian Precedence Case of Political Radicalisation

With the instatement of the Racial Discrimination Act in 1975 the Australian Government facilitated a less stringent process of immigration intended to increase incremental accession to the country, thereby challenging the perceived public welfare of a nation and the geo-political continent in isolation, traditionally subject to selective and somewhat exclusive immigration admission and virtually non-existent rogue immigration. Concerning this aforementioned public welfare there are two defendable interests of which the baby-boomers’ view represents one of them. The baby-boomers – the post-World War II generation of Australia, inherently believe that all the public and private wealth currently enjoyed in Australia is a product of the post-World War II economic efforts of the then Australian labour force, whereas the view held in contradiction is that the baby-boomers are largely responsible for hyper-inflated costs of living, housing and public goods, since the boom is attributable to the deficit spending pattern of the generation. This is an important aspect and a key tenet of the polemic, since the prevalent view endorsed and propagated by many right-wing radical movements concerning immigration is that it should be regarded as a counteracting force which impacts the momentum of any local economy. In consequence these contradicting views of the economy need to be fully understood in the context of the state and its economy just prior to and shortly after introduction of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, in order to arrive at a point that either allows verification or falsification of such a hypothesis. The immediate post-World War II years in Australia have seen many, mostly Keynesian attempts of market intervention. With immigration still largely governed by the ‘White Australia Policy’, the
Australian government enacted the perhaps most significant of all measures aimed at the state’s economy and published in 1945 the White Paper on Full Employment. This set out the social and economic framework that would lead to 25 years of full employment (Quiggin 1994). With regards to unemployment in Australia as the first criteria for economic stability, there has been continued growth in the trend unemployment rate since the mid 1970s (Loundes 1997). This fact correlates unsurprisingly with the economic growth experienced after World War II and the surge in unemployment also correlates with the gradual abandonment of the previously outlined government-endorsed full employment policies during the 1970s. Statistical data validates this sudden surge (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008):

![General Unemployment Rate](image)
For the time series between January 1978 and December 1984 two distinct patterns become apparent. A priori, the gradual but somewhat constant augmentation of the actual unemployed labour force during this period may reflect the actual expected, progressive immigration intake patterns to Australia which were largely facilitated through the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975. Secondly, the surge of unemployment up to and above 10% of the actual available workforce between 1982 and 1983 confirm a rather isolated event that occurred during this period. Consequently, both data series are meant to be interpreted causally: the increase of the Australian population during the years after the enactment of the Racial Discrimination Act correlates with the constant increase of the actual unemployed labour force and the constancy of the unemployment rate prior to 1982 indicates that immigration alone, regardless if it was skilful or not, cannot and should not be seen as the single source for the surge in Australian unemployment. The early 1980s in Australia were dominated by a climate of economic depression. The proliferation of the economic recession in Australia during this period is attributed to the Liberal Party Fraser Government – in office between November 1975 and March 1983, and the government’s
somewhat conservative and unsuccessful approach with regards to economic reforms. The recession hit a largely unprepared Australian economy through a combination of various factors, such as the country’s dependency on imported commodities and their exposure to contingent price volatilities and a currency that as a matter of consequence, declined in international valuation. In other words, ‘Australia’s annual average GDP growth during the Fraser era was two per cent – disappointing in terms of both our historical performance and international comparisons (Kelly 2000)’. Retrospectively, the technological advancements of the early 1980s, in particular the advent of computerisation and the wage increases of previous years of economic boom, which during the recession forced employers to lay-off staff, are held jointly responsible for the aforementioned surge of unemployment. These economic factors in conjunction with other significant socio-demographic indicators, such as for instance the level of education of the general public, contribute to a rise in ethno-centrist racism. This ethno-centrist racism manifests thence as the habit of seeing things only from the point of view of one’s own group (Andersen & Taylor 2005) in the context of this particular group discriminating other groups of people on the basis of characteristics which are held to be inherent in them as a group (Griffiths 2005). It follows that ethno-centrist racism is thence fuelled by a more radical form of applied patriotism and as such takes on authoritarian elements (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, & Levinson 1950) and characteristics that culminate in a ‘blind’ neo-fascist love for one’s own country, very often employing a strategy of using racial, gender or ethnic stereotypes to discriminate minorities and to express a form of ‘tribal’ supremacy. The aforementioned rise in unemployment in Australia was evidently triggered by the global commodities depression of 1982/1983. Economic indicators for this incident cannot be disputed and correlate to the aforementioned workforce and labour statistics published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] and Australia’s noteworthy dependencies and influences on global commodities markets, mainly due to Australia’s international export and trade-balance footprint that encompasses significant amounts of fungible commodities produced by its enormous mining and agricultural/farming industries. Consequently, the influx of ‘non-white’, pan-Asian
immigrants to Australia under the umbrella of embracing principles of multiculturalism affected the overall growth of the population. This behaviour correlates to the ABS statistic that references the unemployed labour force in Australia in real figures, since the gradual and progressive augmentation of the unemployed labour force stands in direct relationship with the population growth for the same period. In summarising this, it can be expected and it is rather not an unusual phenomenon that the unemployed labour force augments proportionally in relation to the overall growth of the population (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006):

The impact of the economic depression of 1981/1982 manifests fully in the sudden spike of unemployment early in 1983 which prior to this date seemingly was at a near constant rate, hovering between four and six per cent of the total workforce. The combination of a near constant unemployment rate and a progressive population growth rate for the same period evidences clearly enough, that progressive immigration policies – as it was and often is heralded by right-wing extremist political and extra-political organisations, is neither the root- cause nor the source
of domestic economic downturn. Quite contrarily, Australia’s failed application of post World War II economic-nationalist Keynesian macro-economic strategies as early as from the late 1960 into the 1970s and beyond, are commonly seen as the decline of the profitability of the Antipodean capitalist enterprise (Cox 2003) which ultimately led to the rise of the adoption of economic reforms under the Hawke/Keating Labor governments for a period of thirteen years from 1983 onwards. The sudden surge of unemployment in Australia early in the 1980s stipulated the required amount of momentum for the formation of right-wing political parties and extra-political activist and interest groups that subsequently sprawled across the country. Racism and neo-fascism then was still an element that could be considered as relatively new to the Australian political landscape, entering public consciousness only as recently as the early 1970s (Jayasuriya 2002). With a domestic economy in downturn, right-wing extremist interest groups embraced this opportunity for proliferation by acting as the little man’s mouthpiece through the use of the pan-Asian immigrant communities as scapegoats for the economic depression and high unemployment, leading to racially inflicted terrorist attacks on foreign residents and immigrants. Founded in 1982, one of these extra-political extreme right-wing activist groups was the now defunct Australian ‘National Action’ movement, possessing an inherent and striking ideological resemblance to authoritarian neo-fascist and ethno-nationalist movements of Great Britain of the same era, such as the British National Front or the British Constitutional Movement. In Australia, the proliferation of militant right-wing extremism didn’t stop with the foundation of aforementioned activist group, but it also provided upwind to already existing nationalist movements, such as the Australian ‘League of Rights’ or the Australian ‘Nationalist Movement’, the latter representing an offspring militant derivative of the ‘National Action’ movement responsible for isolated acts of targeted terrorism (fire bombings) against Asian communities predominantly in Western Australia in the late 1980s. Above and beyond the scope of militant activist movements, the perceived failure of Australia’s multiculturalism was also heavily debated during this era in intellectual and political circles. In 1984, one noteworthy event should stand out that openly debated the success
of Australia’s ongoing efforts in transformation from a colonial ‘white-supremacist’-only nation into a policy-endorsed, multicultural and heteronymous society, which was supposed to be free of racial discrimination. Geoffrey Blainey, then a professor of history at Melbourne University, addressed in his Warrnambool speech of March 1984 (Blainey, Address to Rotary Conference, quoted The Age, 19 March 1984) his raising concerns about pan-Asian immigration to Australia which in his opinion then, would have warranted the call for defence and safeguarding of the principal and foremost Anglo-Celtic culture prevalent in Australia. In outlining his ideology, Blainey in essence stressed the difference of cultural characteristics pertaining to Asian immigrants that differ from aforementioned Anglo-Celtic cultural characteristics, rather than employing distinct and purely phenotypic features to outline racial differences. Blainey’s intention in his address, undoubtedly, was to put the newly found Australian multiculturalism on trial to determine if the White Australia Policy had been successfully abandoned (Joppke 2003, Viviani 1985). Blainey’s speech came precisely at a time, where Australia’s immigration policies were maximally decoupled from skill considerations and tied to instant family reunion and humanitarian help due to policy changes instigated by the Australian Labor Party government. (Birrell & Birrell 1987, Joppke 2003). In a subsequent article (Blainey 1984), Blainey went on and indirectly accused the current Labor government under then Prime Minister Bob Hawke of an ‘Asianisation’ of Australia through a lobbyist-driven intentional deflection of immigration policies, which asserted that the Australian government’s preference for Asian immigration at a time of economic depression threatened social cohesion throughout the country (Laster 2008). Since then, the phenomenon of ‘Asianisation’ has made its way into common Australian political linguistic use and it is nowadays widely employed by a number of various political parties and extra-political activist groups, first and foremost by extreme right-wing parties registered under the Australian Electoral Commission, such as Australia’s ‘One Nation Party’ formerly led by the somewhat polarising Pauline Hanson, or the less successful and smaller ‘Australia First Party’, the latter continuing to use the ‘Asianisation’ term in
an almost derogative fashion in expressing the party’s views on Australian immigration and multiculturalism, e.g. in conjunction with the Cronulla Race Riots of 2005.

In subsumption: Australia is a relatively young country in terms of independence and federation. Throughout its colonial history and even up until now in rather recent times, racially oriented conflicts against immigrants, minorities and indigenous ethnicities feature on its agenda. Militant right-wing extremism and its institutionalisation nevertheless really only picked-up in the early 1970s, with the first significant flares of racially-oriented political and militant actions manifesting in the early 1980s. This paper so far, aimed at illustrating the key factors that have led to this surge of militant and extreme racism in the early to mid 1980s, and it should now be understood that aforementioned economic factors outlined in combination with certain prevalent socio-demographic population patterns should be held responsible for forming the breeding ground for fuelled debates and actions concerning Australian immigration and multiculturalism. This research consequently highlights that it indeed was not the repeal and disposal of the ‘White Australia Policy’ and the subsequent enactment of the ‘Racial Discrimination Act’, nor increased pan-Asian immigration to Australia that augmented as a result of this enactment, but it was the mismanagement of the domestic economy and the false interpretation and misjudgement of the Australian government concerning the development of foreign commodities markets that have led Australia into a short-term crisis leading to the use of predominantly Asian immigrant communities and minorities as scapegoats for means of proliferation by militant and extremist right-wing special interest groups. How does this Australian phenomenon correlate to other sudden surges of racism, in particular to selected countries within the European Union? Can parallels be found that will test this observable fact true in other countries and as such will consequently establish these Australian incidents as a precedence case? How do these parallels manifest in other countries?
Germany

Not only did the reunification on October 3rd, 1990 mark a new chapter in the history of Germany, but it also characterised the advent of a new era of racism in Europe. Historically, in the fairly recent past with regards to the post World War II ‘Wirtschaftswunder’-period of the 1950s and 1960s, West-Germany’s (known officially as the Federal Republic of Germany) reputation as an economic powerhouse became evidently internationally transparent through constant domestic economic growth and favourable foreign trade balances. Nevertheless, especially the global economic climate of the 1970s, notably the international energy crisis that triggered the first OPEC oil embargo in 1973/1974 and a subsequent recurrence of such embargo at the end of the decade in 1979, amongst other politically noteworthy events, posed to be a significant constraint for the German economy which triggered an international slow-down of trade and market performance. Further remarkable features were to a lesser extent economical but rather political, e.g. the end of the 1960s also highlights certain characteristics of societal transformation in West-Germany – the election of Willy Brandt for instance, a loyal Social-Democrat, marked the displacement of the Christian-Democrats from political power in Germany after almost twenty years of continuous rule. Under Brandt, West-Germany engaged in numerous socio-economic reforms which targeted fundamental liberties, such as e.g. equal workplace opportunities, equal rights for homosexuals, work- and pay-structure ameliorations for factory workers and increases in pension or family allowance payments. This period of rule by the social-democrats in the early 1970s also heralded the beginning of rapprochement and harmonisation through bilateral agreements aimed at reciprocal relations with the East – remarkably, first and foremost the relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR /East-Germany) seemed to be pivotal on the agenda. In fostering the relationship with East-Germany, the West-German government took a diametrically opposed stance on the topic, compared to the policies of the antecedent Christian-Democrats, who have held a certain form of hostility and ill-will against its neighbours in the East (Raus 2005).
the key milestones in this period of rapprochement is hence the Basic Treaty of 1972 between East- and West-Germany, which outlines the recognition of East-Germany by its Western counterpart as a sovereign state, but only with respect to a shared premise that Germans in both states are indeed one people and consider themselves as one nation and as such, both states jointly collaborate towards the reunification of Germany at some point in time (Bundespresseamt 1972).

West-Germany in the dawning months of the 1970s was confronted with the growing fear of escalation of left-wing terrorism through the Red Army Faction, an extremist militant splinter-group that saw its origins in the pan-European student revolts and the APO (extra-parliamentary opposition) of the late 1960s. Lastly, it was the aforementioned economic downturn, both – at the start and at the end of the decade of the 1970s that should be held responsible for increased unemployment levels. This economic downturn in conjunction with automation of labour-intensive tasks which resulted from new technology as well as the government’s failure to complete major reforms due to apparent funding issues, contributed towards domestic economic instability and high unemployment. The rule of the Social-Democrats was effectively overthrown by the Christian-Democrats in 1982 through means of a parliamentary constructive vote of no confidence, which as a result ended Helmut Schmidt’s career as chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and installed Helmut Kohl as the head of the West-German executive. It is now commonly understood that Schmidt has lost majority approval from the parliamentary left-wing of his own party due to his approval and rather proactive support of NATO’s cold-war strategy of European nuclear re-armament in response to SALT I & II Nuclear Disarmament Treaties and NATO Double-Track Decision violations. Both, Helmut Kohl – who himself was an ardent defender of European integration politics, and his government, put at the start of the decade market stimulating policies in place aimed at increasing overall wealth and prosperity. These policies coincided with the government’s austerity programme which had the purpose of reducing national debt and inflation,
but retrospectively proved to be an inefficient countermeasure. This instrumental inefficiency is evident in the aforementioned constant augmentation of the unemployment rate which relates directly to productivity and efficiency increases through the growing intensification of competition in a globalised economy and through the automation of factory jobs. Simultaneously, Germany’s role as a NATO partner grew to even greater significance with the government’s endorsed but publicly contested and politically opposed decision, to allow the deployment of nuclear weapons by NATO allied armed forces under the multilateral defence engagement on West-German territory. Doubtlessly an ostensible endeavour to counter Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in its satellite states in Eastern Europe.

The collapse and decay of the communist regime in the former Soviet Union is largely attributed to its government’s incapacity to pay its bills, and this fact indisputably correlates directly with the government’s spending policies and expense patterns on weaponry during the nuclear arms race in the period of the cold war. Rallying against the destruction and exploitation of nature was the role of a fundamentalist and pacifist protest movement in the early 1980s. This green movement subsequently formed a political party (Greens) with the aim to enforce environmental protection through the restriction of the exploitative use of nature for industrial manufacturing and pleading for the use of renewable energies over nuclear power as means of peaceful energy production. Late in 1980s, aforementioned pecuniary difficulties heralded the demise of communism and this concluded the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states, especially the German Democratic Republic. This led to a row of more-or-less peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe and most notably in this context, the reunification of Germany in 1990.

The financial crisis in the German Democratic Republic particularly marks one aspect of inner-German bilateralism. In this relationship, the West was accused of payrolling the German Democratic Republic to ensure its liquidity with regards to its mounting debts and to bolster its
credit rating on the international credit markets, in exchange for the promise of allowing more East-German citizens to leave the country to visit friends and family in the West (Wolle 1998). Events on a political as well as an economical scale culminated in autumn of 1989, first with the opening of the Iron Curtain between Austria and Hungary near Sopron and the subsequent fall of the Berlin Wall that consequently enabled the free passage of people between East- and West Germany.

Reunification, Reconstruction and the Question of Obliterated Legacies and Inherent Ethnicities

The aforementioned Australian precedence case on sudden upsurges on right-wing extremism has substantiated a number of economic and socio-demographic factors that need to occur in parallel for racism to evidently manifest. As such have been identified as a sudden albeit predictable domestic and international economic depression, governmental economic mismanagement, a significant and subsequent increase in the unemployment rate which is unrelated to the actual rate of skilled/unskilled migration and the available existence of at least one minority or ethnic group that fulfils the ingrate role of a scapegoat. Do these factors hold true with regards to the upsurge of extremist racism in Germany of the 1990s and can the events of the first decade after German reunification be subsequently applied and correlated to the events that occurred a decade earlier in Australia?

Unemployment is a main indicator in the assessment of the healthiness of a domestic economy. Gauging the state of the German economy prior to and up until the end of the first decade after reunification, historical time series of various statistical bodies have been consulted. The analysis illustrates the expected outcome according to a labour force study conducted by the German Unemployment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) (ILO 1998 - 2010):
Like in Australia, the unemployment rate in Germany surged to a value of over 10 per cent in the immediate years after reunification. Unlike Australia, in Germany after reunification the actual number of unemployed persons did not increase in a gradual fashion but was subject to a sudden upsurge of a strikingly similar pattern compared to the actual unemployment rate. In hindsight, this occurrence correlates with the assimilation and integration of the ex-GDR population of nearly 16.5 million people (Staatliche Zentralverwaltung für Statistik 1989), corresponding to a demography increase of more than a quarter of the former West-German population. With regards to unemployment it needs to be remarked that the right of and the obligation to work was constitutional law in the former GDR, and as such an official policy of full employment was enforced. Both, East- and West-Germany equally rushed into reunification and in the era of events coming thick and fast, the economic impact of integrating a battered and exploited socialist state into a capitalist-driven society was most likely overlooked. Unemployment in the area of the former GDR, as of January 1992, was estimated to have surpassed an alarming 4.2 million person threshold – comparable to about 27% of the available workforce. This statistic is attributable to the effects of de-industrialisation, the destruction of agriculture and the tearing down of scientific and technical structures and as such comprehensible and traceable on all social levels and resembles a completely new phenomenon for the unprepared ex-GDR citizen (Kallabis 1993). Besides moral constraints of opportunistic behaviour with regards to a potential merger of East – and West-Germany, in a direct comparison with the aforementioned Australian case it is again the government’s direct responsibility of trade and industry mismanagement and failed economic leadership that led Germany into an amplified situation within the scope of the global economic recession of the early 1990s.

This can be attributed, in substantial measure, to the macroeconomic consequences of policies to finance unification (Bishop & Zeager 2001). Post-World War II Germany commonly is understood to have been quite receptive in terms of immigration and implicitly this outlines the immigration
influx through means of a number of distinct waves of arrivals, categorized as the arrival of the ‘guest workers’ in the earliest post-World War II period and the subsequent second wave featuring ‘guest worker’ family repatriation, which ended about 1985 with an estimated total of 4.4 million foreigners having declared until then permanent residency in Germany. With the fall of the Iron Curtain at the end of the 1980s, the third and fourth wave of immigration to Germany consisted out of either asylum seekers who benefitted from German asylum laws which were subsequently changed in 1996 as they were perceived to be too lax, or, repatriation of ethnic German minorities – mostly expellees from former Eastern European and Soviet satellite states (Federal Ministry of the Interior 2008). Furthermore, the Schengen Treaty came effectively into force for Germany in March 1995 as a representative and emblematic act of European Union policy integration and with its enactment the law of free movement of persons within the boundaries of the European Union found application, amplifying the aspects of German immigration.

Lastly, a non-negligible factor in terms of foreign immigration, albeit rather of a temporary than permanent nature, was the deployment of allied occupying forces on both, Eastern as well as Western German territories prior to the first Gulf War and prior to the collapse of the Soviet state and the consequent instances of allied troop withdrawal. The National Democratic Party (NDP) of Germany was founded in 1964 and albeit having a rather insignificant footprint in the political arena – the party managed to secure 14 seats in total in various regional parliaments but didn’t manage to gain representation on a federal or European parliament level, it is somewhat representative of the prevalent ethnocentric and pan-Germanic movements of isolated German splinter groups, which are predominantly at home in the rather impoverished areas of the former GDR. Extremism and militant right-wing activism is being attributed by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution as inherent to the party and several attempts by counter-activist interest groups to ban this party from politics, due to its close resemblance to historical Third Reich national- socialist movements and due to its preferred method of indoctrination of
racial ideas, failed to gain approval under constitutional law albeit the established knowledge that states specifically, have a duty to protect the rights of non-citizens who live within their borders as well as citizens (ICHRP 1999). The NDP’s ideology predominantly revolves around the exclusion and rejection of foreigners on the grounds of alien cultural ancestry and the perceived and indoctrinated Aryan racial dominance and supremacy which puts the emphasis on a common tribal origin, a unity of descent, (ius sanguinis), based on a distinctive cultural heritage (Jayasuriya 2002). Thence, racism manifested in this apparent form in Germany is characteristically very similar to the dominant strain of racism in Australia. The NPD as a small political party shall be held representative for the extremist right-wing political and extra-political landscape of Germany, including but not limiting to the German People’s Union (DVU), the Republicans (Rep) and other associated activist groups, since their ideologies are largely convergent with regards to their condescending and bearish attitude towards immigration. These organisations by large are known for advocating right-wing ethno-pluralism in favour of liberal multiculturalism and the instatement of euphemistically named Nationally Liberated Zones which focussed on the creation of a countervailing power to the government’s monopole of power and areas of clearance designed to exercise sanctions and physical terror against identity forming concepts of their enemies, outside of the prevailing system of government protection (Verfassungsschutz des Landes Brandenburg 2001).

Immediately after reunification, pan-German right-wing extremism increased significantly. This was mostly due to propaganda activities of established West-German right-wing parties like NDP, DVU or the Republicans in the former GDR territories. These activities seem to have circumvented the official doctrine of antifascism which was instated by the Soviets and that prevailed during the reign of the GDR regime (Backes, Baus, & Münkler 2009), since the influx of militant right-wing activism from the West found exponential acceptance amongst the population of Eastern Germany (RAA Berlin e.V. 2007) and militant right-wing activity was presumably promoted through means of
inherent authoritarian characteristics of the former socialist state. This phenomenon left an obvious trail of terror and social destruction in the immediate years after unification – the years 1991 to 1994 bearing eminent evidence of this observable fact, as the unified Germany experienced a surge of right-wing terror and violence on a magnitude previously thought inconceivable and with an intensity that nearly instilled a déjà vu pogrom atmosphere of a bygone era amongst a significant part of the general population of Eastern Germany. Remarkably, around 50 per cent of all acts of racism-induced violence of that time occurred in Eastern Germany (Stöß 2006), which can largely be explained in the methodologies and policies of immigrant integration used by the socialist East-German and capitalist West-German government. Both countries historically pursued a strategy of recruiting foreign workers to counteract labour shortages during times of economic boom. In West-Germany, immigrant ‘guest workers’ had difficulties at first to integrate into a somewhat closed German society but nevertheless were given attainable and realistic opportunities to become either permanent residents or German nationals.

The latter possibility offered through the acquisition of the German citizenship to become equal members of the prevailing social order. The process of immigrant integration in East-Germany, on the contrary, was by means of governmental decree non-desirable, since the recruitment of workers from other socialist states and their stay in the GDR, was intentionally only a temporary measure. The discernible difference in the approach of immigrant integration between the East and the West was that essentially in the West, migrant workers were endowed with the same equal individual liberties as their German counterparts, whereas in the East, civil liberties of the migrant worker population were artificially restricted, e.g. migrant workers in the West were free to declare residence wherever really it pleased them in comparison to East-Germany, where migrant workers were purposely billeted in barracks outside of any form of agglomeration, to avoid any attempts of overlap and integration between cultures (Waibel 1996). According to the official ideology of the SED – the ruling party of the former GDR, neither anti-Semitism nor racism were
officially known to be a problem or more precisely, known to be in existence, but in later years evidence has proven this to be a false statement when numerous recorded incidents of East-German anti-Semitic and racism-oriented manifestations verifiably appeared on the radar of political historians (Waibel 1996).

The occurrence of the aforementioned surge in militant right-wing activism and the wave of violent terrorist attacks culminated after reunification in Eastern Germany with fire-bombings (Der Stern 2007), that affected the immigrant communities in Germany in a similar fashion like fire-bombings were affecting an Asian minority in Australia a decade earlier. This surge is conditionally explained through an already existing network of racist activism in East-Germany, and the failure of the West-German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution to recognise this threat and to put effective countermeasures in place that would take effect upon reunification. Interestingly enough, the increase of racial violence in the unified Germany administered on society through individual militant right-wing extremist splinter groups and cadre organisations, such as ‘Kameradschaften’, showed signs of incoherence.

Unexpectedly, this increase did neither correlate with expected progressive and incremental gains in terms of actual memberships to political right-wing parties nor with the expected amount of subscribers who would endorse the ideology of such right-wing political parties in federal or regional elections, but it reflects the sentiments of an entire generation of youths. Its occurrence hence has to be understood in the context of resembling an active part of a prevailing East-German subculture (Klose 2007). This subculture phenomenon is possibly rationalised in the context of an absence of confrontation that openly questioned the coerced Soviet indoctrination of Dimitrov’s Theory of Fascism, which describes fascism as an open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital (Dimitrov 1935), leading to the understanding of the East-German population that fascism as well as any
derivative form of it will not find any applicability in a socialist state. Lastly, the ongoing dispute with regards to the perception of the ethnic disparity between East- and West-Germans amongst themselves, e.g. the ‘Ossi – Wessi debate’, is continuing to delay the integration and reconstruction efforts of the German government and has, historically, been attributed with one of the main causes of false and mistakenly-comprehended inequalities of opportunities that led to amplified racism by aggrieved, disadvantaged and discriminated East-Germans against immigrant minorities.

Conclusively, the assessment of the upsurge of racism in Germany in the 1990s yields a certain awareness of factors that are related, in context, to the particular history of the country. Both parts of Germany have, as a matter of immediate historical consequence, a different relationship with manifestations of racism after World War and precisely this perspective, renders any correlation with the Australian precedence case based on purely inherent historical benchmarks invalid. Reviewing the German case under prevailing economical and socio-demographical aspects nevertheless, reveals a correlation with the characteristics intrinsic to the aforementioned Australian precedence case. It can be said with salient certainty and congruence concerning key economic factors that, e.g. the actual rate of unemployment in conjunction with an incubating or ongoing economic depression and the failure in the execution and application of governmental immigration policies as well as the use of minorities and ethnicities as scapegoats by extremist right-wing political groups and extra-political activist associations, are responsible for the surge in right-wing activism.

The case of Germany clarifies, that the innate roots of upsurges of racism are indeed not to be found in a comparison of purely historical aspects but rather in a contextual, methodological approach of comparing key economic and socio-demographic data under the aspects of detecting patterns of congruence.
Austria

Political radicalisation increased significantly within Austria in the first decade of the new millennium, and in assessing a potential upsurge of Austrian right-wing populism it needs to be understood that the country, albeit a geopolitical neighbour of Germany, at the outset should be considered under the aspect of a largely different post-World War II starting point. Austria peacefully gained sovereign independence from allied administration in 1955 through reinstatement of constitutional powers of its second republic. In the years prior to this declaration of renewed Austrian independence, a number of noteworthy political events took place which in hindsight, not only changed the perceptions of many Austrians with regards to their awareness of racism and racially-oriented conflicts of interests, but created a subculture in Austria which culminated in the foundation of a joint sense of right-wing extremism and neo-nationalism that at the start of the 21st century seemed for a significant part of the population like a natural, inert characteristic of being Austrian. The precursor of Austria’s distorted view on militant right-wing activism may be sought in its somewhat special relationship with the fascist dictatorship of Germany’s Third Reich. Hitler, initially an Austrian national by birth, in one of his first moves after ascension to power annexed Austria through a peaceful military invasion which was then unanimously and collectively endorsed by the population of Germany and Austria alike. Retrospectively, it was a largely popular move by Hitler who was greeted by cheering Austrians expressing sympathy rather than antipathy towards the German national-socialists occupation.

Historically, this invasion occurred at the right time as Austria’s independent strain of fascism, which saw its ideology deeply rooted in the Marxist-socialist doctrines of Italy’s Benito Mussolini, was concurrently progressing and gaining large waves of unequivocal support amongst the population. Support amongst the Austrians for a stronger fascist-movement emerging out of Germany and being implanted on Austrian soil, thence was not as far-fetched as it might have
appeared but rather the logical consequence resulting out of a tactical move and prevailing political conditions. Nevertheless, it was the Declaration of Moscow in 1943, where the question of guilt concerning Austria’s participation met the question of victimisation: it were indeed the allied forces who established that Austria under the law of nations and public international law should be regarded as a victim, rather than a collaborative supporter of German national-socialism and the annexation of Austria by Germany should be voided and nullified. Consequently, the Austrian state having been internationally acquitted of any World War II crimes fully sustained and maintained this view and mythology of it being a victim for a considerable amount of time throughout its second republic, to the point where this doctrine became a state-endorsed, artificially suspended and democratically sustained delusion. In addition to this ideology, Austria pursued a somewhat less stringent, less rigorous and perhaps also less effective process of post-World War II denazification.

Albeit under allied occupation until 1955, Austria politically functioned under a self-established provisional government since the first day of liberation from German occupancy through the invasion of allied Soviet troops. Through this process of self-governance, Austria established fairly early autonomy over the implanted control structure of the allied forces with regards to the proceedings of denazification trials. Subsequently, with denazification in the hands of Austrian judges, a certain national self-interest pertaining to the issuance of precocious and premature amnesties that concerned former fascist collaborators, followers and sympathisers became apparent under the principle, that a qualified worker engaged on reconstruction work for instance would be worth more to society than the same qualified worker locked away or even executed on the grounds of collaborative charges of antecedent fascist engagements. As a source of authority explains: the Austrian society was then composed of more than 15 per cent of the population being former members of the Third Reich’s ruling party (NSDAP) ... and by 1957, two years after
the treaty that granted Austria sovereignty and twelve years after World War II, there weren’t any former fascist sympathisers (Nazis) left in Austria anymore (Brandner 2005).

This ‘efficiency’ in dealing with the post-World War II denazification proceedings has also been remarked by other historians and researchers alike, and perhaps the most encompassing quote concludes, that ‘while Austrians within the Nazi hierarchy constituted a minority, their percentage in the killing machinery was disproportionately large. Only a small number of them were brought to trial after 1945 and not all of them were sentenced (Garscha & Kuretsidis-Haider 1997)’. Austria’s post-World War II history, hence, is a history irrefutably distorted with respect to the perception of actual incidents and as such the country suffers from a sustained delusion which has been relayed in this fashion to future post-war generations. The result of Austria living its own version of historic events ended in temporary diplomatic isolation of the country from most of its neighbours in Western Europe and the United States due to Austria providing a ‘safe harbour’ with regards to prosecution attempts of former Nazi collaborators, e.g. ‘... the country remains one of the least likely to prosecute any of its many unprosecuted Holocaust perpetrators (Zuroff 2002)’. This diplomatic crisis reached its apex during the Waldheim Affair where the former UN General Secretary and Austrian National Kurt Waldheim was elected President of the Federal Republic of Austria albeit stalwart evidence of him being a collaborator during World-War II.

Modern Political Right-Wing Populism – the Newfound Radicalisation of Austria

Of striking importance is the rise of an emblematic right-wing Carinthian politician named Jörg Haider and the ascent of the right-wing extremist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) which managed to secure almost 27% of the votes of the population in the federal elections in 1999 (Bundesministerium für Inneres 1999). The success of the FPÖ during the elections of 1999 triggered consequences within Austria’s political landscape that resulted in international feedback concerning the coalition government between the Austrian People’s Party ÖVP, Christian-democratic and rather conservative in nature and its right-wing coalition partner, Austria’s FPÖ.
The increase in popularity of the FPÖ amongst the population is a combination of circumstances that originated with the events of the Waldheim Affair, followed by the demise of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and Austria’s accession to the European Union in 1995. All these events have in one way or another contributed towards an identity crisis of the Austrian nation as these key incidents in the immediate Austrian history reflect inherent and problematic characteristics of the Austrian nation and therefore this reflection also underscores quite strongly the conflicting and contradictory inner mentalities of the people that manifest in surprise and alienation within the context of a joint European political culture.

In particular these types of socio-demographic, economical and political behavioural constructs instigated lengthy and unresolved public debates, for instance the benefits of a consensus democracy as opposed to a conflict democracy and in the same context it posed the question whether to restructure or to obliterate social partnerships between employee- and trade-associations. Also, coming to terms with Austria's past rather than denegation of historical facts or alternatively, the tightrope-walk between the establishment of an Austrian welfare state and the governance of the state according to neoliberal principles have indicated considerable and substantial changes in Austria’s self-conception and in the perception of Austria in terms of foreign relations. Conclusively, the conditions for an upsurge of right-wing populism are established in situations where a civil society could not ascertain an increased civic awareness due to prevalent procedural flaws in the political process of democracy, and thence, it is precisely this democratic deficiency and consequent underdevelopment that was initially caused and maintained through historical amnesties and suppressed realities of yesteryear.

Accordingly, it does come as no surprise that the FPÖ has used this apparent state of confusion to capitalise on increasing its electorate in this prevailing state of ambiguity and incertitude through development of its embellished right-wing ideology that is largely contra Europeanisation including
participation in the joint monetary union and the Eastern European enlargement of the EU, as well as internationalisation in general (Scharsach & Kuch 2000). Political predecessors such as an increase in Europeanisation and internationalisation with regards to applicability of EU policies, the loss of a stable and sovereign currency in exchange of a joint EU monetary system as well as the polemical debates surrounding immigration through Eastern European EU expansion, which was perceived as a threat to the situation of the local labour market and as a threat to the established welfare state in general, instilled a menacing sense of uncertainty amongst the population. The analysis so far does not conclusively yield any information about key economic performance indicators and consequently, Austria’s unemployment rate for the period between the year 2000 and 2009 (Statistik Austria 2010) will be examined:

![Unemployment Rate](image)

**Figure 6: Unemployment Rate**

Whereas the total unemployment rate in this ten-year time period augmented 1.1 per cent from a rate of 3.7 per cent in the year 2000 to a value of 4.8 per cent in the year 2009, within the same period of time, the youth unemployment rate comparatively skyrocketed from an initial higher value
of 5.2 per cent to its peak of 10.3 per cent in 2005 and to 10 per cent flat in 2009, which compares to a 4.8 (5.1) per cent rise for the same period.

Notably, the youth unemployment rate quasi doubled in the first decade of the third millennium. The following analysis demonstrates the impact of net-migration of foreign citizens to Austria. Net-migration in this context here shall refer to the balance between arrived foreign immigrants and departed foreign immigrants within the same period as aforementioned unemployed rate statistics (Statistik Austria 2010):

According to the statistical data available, net-immigration to Austria projected on a time series between the year 2000 and 2009, has been on a slight and gradual decline. This reflects the relationship between the immigrant arrival and departure rate, whereby increases in the immigrant arrival rate are being met by proportionally greater increases in the immigrant departure rate, which consequently leads to a decline in net-migration. Austrian politics encompasses an
approximate separation of the political electorate into three different fractions, e.g. those who support the first fraction of civil Christian-democratic values. The second fraction, traditionally, is composed out of supporters for the socialistic social-democratic ideology which is again separate to the third fraction’s political doctrine that is oriented towards the propagation of German-nationalism and national-liberalism and generally connotated with the dissemination and proliferation of extremist right-wing ideologies. Amongst the third fraction, the two most significant political parties in terms of electoral representation are aforementioned FPÖ and BZÖ – the latter being a now established but former splinter party, brought into being by the enigmatic late Jörg Haider in 2005 after his proposed FPÖ party restructuring plan did not find significant support within the party itself.

The compositional characteristics of supporters of the third fraction is distinctive, to the extent that enthusiasts and sponsors of the right-wing ideology alike can be aggregated as typically young and rather uneducated ‘losers of modernisation’ – especially and particularly with regards to their identification with the prevailing polemical immigration debate that seems to be artificially maintained by the third fraction and at the core of the right-wing ideology (Pelinka 2006). According to a study conducted in 2008 by the Austrian Institute for Social Research and Consulting (Zeglovits 2008), the electorates of the FPÖ and BZÖ parties seem to be largely composed out of young, uneducated and predominantly male voters that fear future economic uncertainty like joblessness and further categorical and situational social decline. The employment situation for Austria’s youth is particularly precarious, since the situation of the current high number of unemployed youths correlates on first-degree basis with a combination of structural and seasonal labour market factors, followed by a high number of school leavers having attained the most minimal requirements in terms of compulsory schooling, and with this educational background these school leavers seem to be difficult to be placed in the job market.
Conclusively, the Australian precedence case that correlates surges of political right-wing extremism with patterns in the domestic economy and socio-demographical behaviour arrangements once again holds true for the brief case study detailing the antecedent proliferation of Austrian right-wing extremism in the first years of the new millennium. This comparative study highlights electoral currents leading to an increased influx of support for right-wing political and extra-political organisations that originate from distinct socio-economic and demographic configurations that aggregate under the ideology of guarding the inherent racial integrity.

Compared to the Australian or German case studies mentioned earlier, for what Austria is concerned, the initial surge of right-wing populism may not actually lie in the aftermath and recovery period of a prolonged global economic depression, but was something that was brought upon the Austrian people through means of their own choice with regards to coming to terms with their own past. This now manifests, and by no means should be understood in a way that would link racism with an inherent and innate characteristic of the Austrian people, but in the context of the consequences and ramifications of modernisation, internationalisation, Europeanisation and general unpreparedness of antecedent Austrian governments to anticipate economic and social changes of a magnitude of this scale. Minority groups and ethnicities again are being used prevalently by right-wing extremist parties and their adherents as scapegoats to mask and divert from domestic structural deficiencies, integration inequalities and apparent economic drawbacks, which should be at the centre of efficient governmental policy execution.
Hungary

The political environment in modern-day Hungary is to a large extent influenced by its recent past and very broadly encompasses major political events such as the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that triggered the aftermath of necessarily fulfilling the conditions of the Treaty of Trianon, its reinstated but short-lived monarchy that concluded in the occupation through the Germans during World War II and its subsequent transformation into an axis power, expressing support for Germany’s war efforts and ideology. With the end of World-War II came liberation and later renewed occupation through the Soviets who transformed Hungary not only into a largely semi-agrarian Soviet satellite state, but the Soviets, similar to their efforts of repression in East Germany, changed the country into an oppressed people’s republic having a joint border in common with its free and democratic neighbour Austria, its former co-monarchy under the monarchic union between Austria and Hungary during the reign of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 1956 marked a significant event in Hungary’s post-World War II history with the unsuccessful and bloody uprising against the Soviet socialist regime and subsequent reinstatement of Soviet authoritarian rule and permanent Soviet military presence within the country, until 1989, which is known in history as the year of the downfall of the Soviet Union and with it, the structure that held together the socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc. It was not until then, October 23rd, 1989 with a peaceful political revolution at full swing until Hungary was proclaimed a republic and emerged as one of the first Eastern Bloc nations as a fully sovereign, democratic and independent state concluding its trajectory regarding European integration with its accession to the European Union in 2004. This somewhat sketchy and brief historical review does not aim to fulfil the requirements of any in-depth analysis worth of the work of a historian, but what it does do quite successfully is to highlight some of the key tenets that have led in very recent years to Hungarian political, extra-political and paramilitary radicalisation and racism. As a starting point into this analysis and of particular interest at this juncture are the remnants of Hungary’s own perception of its former
imperial glory and grandeur and the implications and ramifications brought upon the country through the Treaty of Trianon, post-World War I. With the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the monarchy in Hungary was reinstated and Miklós Horthy was put in charge as regent until the day, the (Habsburg) royals would return to their throne in Hungary.

The 1920 Treaty of Trianon between Hungary and the allied and associated powers stipulated as a consequence of the armistice and the surrender of the Hungarian monarchy during the end of World War I, that Hungary was to cede a large amount of its territory (Treaty of Trianon [Transcript] 1997), amounting in total territorial losses of over 72% of its former landmass, 64% of its former population and 31% of ethnic Hungarians ending-up being displaced outside the state’s newly redrawn borders (Frucht 2004). For many Hungarians, especially the elderly generations, the aftermath of the Trianon Treaty remains a trauma (MTI 2010, Kulish 2008), which is at best difficult if not impossible to overcome. The after-effects of aformented treaty were manifold but nothing compared to the immediate consequences of the rise of fascism in the years prior to World War II. Consequently it was Hungary’s cultural development that came into focus of right-wing activists which exploited the current fragile mental state of the Hungarians battling with the Trianon-disbelief (Marsovszky 2002). Fascism then targeted predominantly the reasonably well integrated Hungarian Jewish community which traditionally possessed highly distinguishable features such as e.g. literacy skills, compared to a highly illiterate, semi-agrarian Hungarian ethnicity. The fascist ideology, oriented largely at the actions of the pogrom in Germany, was to instil a sense of authoritarian nationalism that would yield a pedigreed Hungarian race and culture ready to overcome the Trianon-trauma through the recovery of the lost territories. Hence, the rise of fascism in Hungary prior to World War II can be attributed to a number of significant underlying motives. Increased trade activities with other pro-fascist governments, like Italy for instance, acted as active countermeasures to combat the proliferation of the global economic depression in combination with the inherent desire to regain its former territories and to return to former
splendour as a Hungarian nation with an artificially inflated self-conception of authoritarian nationalism.

All of these factors have made Hungary join forces with Hitler and turn the country into an axis power. For the record, Hungary largely subscribed to the German Nazi ideology and actively collaborated with the German forces with regards to administrative tasks and deportation of Jews until the end of World War II. Until this period, Hungary also regained most of its former territories which again had to be ceded as a condition of the post-war Treaty of Paris. Post-World War II Stalinism in Hungary significantly softened after several years of Soviet dictatorship and with regards to racism and anti-Semitism, Hungary defended a staunch line of outlawing such activities. ‘In terms of its domestic policy, the official self-articulation of the Hungarian socialist system – in contrast to other socialist states – contained no anti-Semitic content or elements, coherent or sporadic (Gerő 2008)’, and the only manifested form of anti-Semitism – albeit never translated into domestic policy, was Hungary’s stance on Israel, perceptibly influenced by Soviet foreign policy. ‘In this respect, the system’s perceived foreign-policy interests and its ideology met, and in the long term effectively made the bed for the brand of left-wing anti-Semitism that would also be readily accessible to the proponents of post-communist anti-Semitism (Gerő 2008)’. The post-World War II demographics of Hungary up to and including now, give rise of a different and compelling story to be told concerning its ethnic minorities – Hungary’s persistent identification and integration issues with the Roma community. According to the 2001 census, residents were given the opportunity for self-identification according to a given national or ethnic group, of which apparently only approximately 2.02 per cent (205,720 residents out of total 10,198,315 Hungarian residents) were of Roma origin (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2009).

These numbers are much higher typically, since the connotation of being of Roma descent in Hungary also carries the stigma of discrimination and of being undeniably undesired and
unwanted in the country and people naturally would stay clear from any measures of self-denunciation. Some official Romani civil society organisations certainly demonstrate a less conservative approach in their numbers and ‘would put the number of Roma in the country at 800,000-1,000,000, or up to 10 per cent of the total population of Hungary (Cahn 2007)’. One of these Romani civil organisations going even as far as predicting a highest likelihood estimate, where until the year 2050 the national population of Hungary would be subject to a decline and in return the Roma population would be rising to a rate of just under 21 per cent (20.9 per cent) of the population (ECRE 2003). The discrimination of this minority has a long-standing history in European culture.

Targeted violence under the beliefs and principles of ethnical extermination or genocide was institutionalised and upsurged during the Third Reich under Hitler’s ideology of the prevailing Arian race, but even ‘the end of World War II, during which the Roma were victims of Nazi genocide, did not bring about a cessation of hundreds of years of resentment against them and persecution in Europe. Discrimination persisted even during the communist era, despite the ideology of equality (Stauber 2009)’. In addition to aforementioned efforts targeted at the restoration of a Great Hungary which foresees the inclusion and renewed annexation of Hungary’s former counties, the country’s historically important and latently present anti-Semitism as well as the political and socio-economic stigmatisation and marginalisation of its major Roma ethnicities, such as the Hungarian-speaking Romungros, the Romanian-speaking Beás, and the Romani-speaking Olach (OSCE 2000) feature on the current agenda of political right-wing activism. Hungary’s extreme right-wing nationalists in this present era are more frequently employing the unsolved question of repatriation or at least expressing the desire to grant full citizenship rights to expatriated indigenous Hungarians and their descendants who are resident outside the Hungarian borders in the former Hungarian territories prior to the enactment of the conditions of the Treaty of Trianon.
Indigenous Hungarian national minorities are present in all of the neighbouring countries of Hungary, and a precise estimate sums up the resident population to approximately 600,000 people in Slovakia, 180,000 people in Ukraine, 2,000,000 people in Romania, 300,000 people in the former territories of Yugoslavia, except Slovenia with 8,000 people and Austria with 6,000 people (Kontra 1999).

Albeit Hungary taking a fairly dominant and progressive role in Central- and Eastern Europe concerning the (self-) governance of minorities through the enacted Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, it seems that precisely these minority policies are in effect concentrated efforts to benefit indigenous Hungarian communities and minorities resident outside the country whereas the initial intent of this law and its policies was to bring betterment and advantages to Romani and other ethnic minorities living in Hungary. As a recent OSCE report states:

*The basic democratic principle that individuals should have a say in how they are governed requires nothing less, and pragmatic considerations counsel the same approach. The importance of minority participation in public affairs is specifically provided in paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document which requires participating States to “respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities.” Unfortunately, countless programs for Roma have been destined to fail because they were developed without Roma participation, and, correspondingly, with scant awareness of the specific culture and needs of the intended beneficiaries. Equally important, programs for Roma designed without Roma are scarcely likely to earn the confidence and commitment of Roma (OSCE 2000).*

The most ubiquitous example of favouring indigenous Hungarians abroad rather than ethnic minorities within the country was the referendum instigated by the World Federation of Hungarians (MVSZ) conducted in 2004 on making the Hungarian citizenship available to indigenous Hungarian minorities outside of Hungary. The referendum failed due to low-voter turnout (Tóth & Neumann 2005).
Traditionally, unresolved issues concerning the right of citizenship for indigenous Hungarians in conjunction with the Roma immigration and integration issues are being picked-up by various right-wing movements in Hungary, such as JOBBIK for instance, which under the umbrella of populism declared the failure of the referendum a ‘day of betrayal’ for all Hungarians since despite of the low-voter turnout in the referendum, the majority of voters still voted ‘yes’ to granting citizenship rights (JOBBIK 2008).

Matters of National Identification and the Failed European Union Miracle

The most recent parliamentary election results in Hungary, as of April 2010, are fairly well known, as the outcome of these elections is synonym for once again passing another landmark event of European political radicalisation. Fidesz, one of Hungary’s oldest political parties with regards to the existence of the current republic, managed to win a groundbreaking 263 parliamentary seats, and with it, the absolute majority of over 52.7 per cent. This almost revolutionary win of public support and consent was achieved through the tremendous losses of the former first and ruling MSZP socialist party, who in the eyes of many Hungarians are being held responsible for creating many of the current economical, socio-demographical and cultural problems the country is facing. The outcome of the direct democratic elections must be considered representative albeit a low-voter turnout of 64.3 per cent in the first round and 46.5 per cent in the second round. The political ethos of Fidesz is centre-right conservative and in many ways similar and comparable with France’s UMP party. The striking significance of these recent parliamentary elections is the success of Jobbik, a conservative and radical nationalist party with largely controversial ideas concerning racial integration of ethnic minorities and Europeanisation, which scored more than 16.6 per cent of the votes cast, making it the third biggest political fraction in Hungarian politics and securing 47 seats in the parliament for the current election period.
Jobbik’s ideology is largely demonstrated through right-wing populism with strong sentiments that instills nationalist attitude based on common and joint ethnic origins and culture amongst the Hungarian race. Jobbik’s anti-elitist ideology and the proliferation of its national populism shows strong resemblances with the dominant beliefs of agrarian political parties, which explains why support for the party is not unanimous in Hungary, but electorates that offer a high amount of support and consent to Jobbik’s ideology will generally correlate to geographical areas of increased agrarian productivity, predominantly in the North- and Southeast of Hungary. Jobbik is also indirectly linked with the Hungarian Guard, a self-proclaimed, anti-constitutional (albeit this being appealed presently) civic organisation resembling the radically nationalist appearance and structure of World War II Hungarian Arrow-Cross party fascists, which supports Jobbik in presence during domestic party rallies and otherwise takes on the self-inflicted role as guardian of peace and Hungarian culture and morals.

The Jobbik electorate is composed straight out of the middle of society and should not be understood as a political fringe party. The statistical over-representation of Jobbik voters that possess Hungarian equivalent A-level university-entrance diplomas or a similar statistical over-representation of first-time voters concludes that Jobbik should not be considered as a catch basin for frustrated voters (Dieringer 2010). Nevertheless, structurally Jobbik has two dominant exceptions. First and foremost the aforementioned geographic concentration and stronghold of its electorate is situated in Hungary’s East. It is a region of traditional high unemployment, significant structural change and prevailing problems with its ethnic minorities. Secondly, Jobbik is mostly composed out of men which consequently would lead to the assumption that women generally feel that Jobbik’s nationalist, populist, xenophobe and anti-Semitic rhetoric does not appeal nor apply to them (Dieringer 2010). Unemployment statistics correlate with Hungary’s EU accession in 2004. The unemployment rate indicates a three per cent drop for the period of 1998 to 2004. This was due to initial transitioning efforts of the socialist economy into a private-sector capitalist economy.
and in addition was made possible through the application of the Bokros Austerity Plan. With Hungary joining the EU in 2004, the unemployment rate retrospectively indicated a trend into the opposite direction, as unemployment rose to 11 per cent in the final quarter of 2009 (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2010):

An important study conducted prior to the accession of Hungary to the EU reflects the two major problems the country has been exposed to prior to joining the EU. The study detailed and highlighted the primary problem as being the current economic situation and future outlook, applicable to 44 per cent of the general population and on second rank, unemployment in the country, which 42 per cent of the population seemed to agree upon. The fears and worries surrounding the unemployment situation were described as ‘interesting because the registered unemployment rate has been continuously decreasing since 2000 and, at 5.5%, it is now one of the lowest in Europe’, stressing the distrust and disbelief of many Hungarians with regards to the amelioration of the economic situation and stability of the domestic job market through means of
EU integration (Magyar Gallup Intézet 2004). As statistically proven, the domestic unemployment situation indeed worsened with Hungary’s entry into the EU and with regards to economic development based upon the country’s GDP output and the domestic consumer price index as indicators of significance, the situation retrospectively mirrors the fears remarked by the population (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2009):

![GDP Development](image)

The statistic explains that after years of constant economic growth throughout Hungary’s years of applied socialism the GDP output dropped towards the end of the 1980s as a result of domestic market changes which were related to private ownership and the introduction of free market principles. The GDP output re-augmented almost immediately, albeit rather in a slow and very gradual incline from 1992 onwards until 2005 – the year subsequent to Hungary’s EU accession, where a tendency towards a statistical plateau in the annual results of the GDP output can be
remarked. Logically, a similar behaviour should be expected from the consumer price index (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2009)¹:

![Figure 10: Consumer Price Index Development](image)

The analysis of the statistical data reflects the sceptical remarks of the Hungarian population regarding the correlation of the country’s EU accession and its future economic development. The overall performance of the consumer price index corresponds largely to the development of the GDP and on first sight, might be interpreted as the expected results of a performing economy. At the bottom line, though, the statistical data available since 1989 shows a consumer price index which reflects an almost perverted decrease of purchasing power due to currency inflation. Furthermore, the constant augmentation of the consumer price index does not correlate with the drop in GDP output for the period between 1989 and 1992, but is inversely reflected as augmentation rather than decline. A statistical overlay of real capital income and real wage income

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¹ The Hungarian Statistical Office offers a number of various historical cost of living indices based on various categories, such as service, utilities, food and other goods. For illustrative purposes, the combined consumer price index has been used.
for the same period reconfirms this pessimistic and sceptical outlook of many Hungarians (Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2010): 

![Household Income Development](image)

Figure 11: Household Income Development

Both, real capital income and real wage income correspond by trend with Hungary’s GDP development, with regards to its negative growth between the late 1980s and the early 1990s and its sharp bend towards a plateau or negative progression from 2005 onwards. The development of these two indices nevertheless does not correspond to the development of the consumer price index, which only shows constant and intensified augmentation since 1988. There is a certain relationship between these economic statistics, its indicators and the belief of many Hungarians, who thought that the EU accession would inject money through consumerism and this in turn would solve all their problems. ‘They were disappointed when that material wealth eluded them and there was no EU miracle (Dessewffy 2009)’. Hungary’s political radicalisation thence originates from a number of factors which occur in parallel: a general domestic economic imbalance often seen in the inflation of domestic currency and consequential non-proportional
increases of the costs of living, high level of (regional) unemployment due to structural inequalities, emigration of qualified resources, unresolved and ongoing integration concerns of ethnic minorities and immigrants of and a latent presence of racist tendencies. The Australian precedence case established the factors for a sudden upsurge in political or non-political right-wing extremism. These factors include a prevailing economic depression, unemployment and a number of social-demographic aspects, such as the belief in racial superiority and dominance leading to stigmatisation and the derogative use of ethnicities and racial minorities as scapegoats. Using the Hungarian case study for direct comparison of these characteristics it is evident, that the economic requirements as well as the socio-demographic elements hold true and hence validate the theory established by the Australian precedence case.
Conclusion

This comparative study aims to deliver a methodological approach in assessing and determining the economic and socio-demographic factors responsible for upsurges of radical political and civil right-wing extremism in four different nation states under consideration, assessment and observance of each nation state’s independent historical and cultural characteristics. This study verifies the hypothesis that racially-inflicted and sudden extremist right-wing movements generally are subject to cohesive and amalgamated patterns that are linked to key indicators such as, for instance, the current state of the economy, the forecasted economic outlook, the inflation rate and purchasing power disparity as well as the unemployment rate in context with the job market situation.

Similar linkages that correlate economic growth with the support for political extremist platforms have also been previously analysed through means of empirical studies. Notably a very recent study which concluded in research of 16 European countries and postulated that for every percentage point decline in GDP growth over two quarters, support for the far right rises by 0.136 percentage points. The research further speculates that a major selling point of far-right parties is ‘non-traditional’ redistribution – not so much from rich to poor, but away from ethnic, occupational, or regional minorities (Brückner & Grüner 2010).

With regards to the importance of socio-demographic aspects in light of support for this study, it has been determined that factors such as e.g. age, education, gender, geopolitical location and profession sustain domestic development of right-wing proliferation to a much wider degree as initially presumed.
This paper concludes in explaining the unanimous mechanics behind right-wing populism with regards to the use of ethnicities and minorities as scapegoats under the aspects of ethno-centrist racism and nationalism. This technique is employed to deflect from domestic economical and socio-demographic range of dysfunctions and maladaptive governmental immigration and integration policies in order to gain political consent and societal legitimacy. It has further been proven that immigration per se cannot be held solely responsible – but may well be a contributing factor, for economic and socio-demographic deterioration, regardless of a state’s political history or geopolitical location, but the study stresses the fact that extremist right-wing populism uses this aforementioned non-correlation to create a method of relaying false information to its audience. This form of propaganda finds growing acceptance amongst a trepidant and worried population already or in imminent danger of being challenged by domestic economic and socio-demographic problems.
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